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Abstract - Preparedness for chemical, biological, and 
radiological/nuclear incidents at nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) includes the deployment of well 
trained emergency response teams. While teams are 
expected to do well, data from other domains 
suggests that the timeliness and accuracy associated 
with incident response can be improved through 
collaborative human-robotic interaction. Many 
incident response scenarios call for multiple, 
complex procedure-based activities performed by 
personnel wearing cumbersome personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and operating under high levels of 
stress and workload. While robotic assistance is 
postulated to reduce workload and exposure, 
limitations associated with communications and the 
robot’s ability to act independently have served to 
limit reliability and reduce our potential to exploit 
human –robotic interaction and efficacy of response. 
Recent work at the Idaho National Laboroaty (INL) 
on expanding robot capability has the potential to 
improve human-system response during disaster 
management and recovery.  Specifically, increasing 
the range of higher level robot behaviors such as 
autonomous navigation and mapping, evolving new 
abstractions for sensor and control data, and 
developing metaphors for operator control have the 
potential to improve state-of-the-art in incident 
response. This paper discusses these issues and 
reports on experiments underway intelligence 
residing on the robot to enhance emergency 
response.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The INL is taking steps to design robotic capabilities 
that can be used to address a variety of radiological 
hazards in nuclear power plants. We begin with a brief 
overview of how the nuclear power industry currently 
addresses these hazards and then introduce new 
technologies that can be used to augment the current 
toolset of capabilities available to emergency response 
decision makers. Finally, we discuss the first in a series 
of live experiments which will use humans and robots 
together in a simulated response to radiological hazards. 
The goal is to better understand the benefits and 
limitations to using existing teleoperated robotic 
approaches as well as newly available autonomous and 
intelligent robotic capabilities. 
In 1996, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) published in the Federal Register the Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) 
Operational Plan covering a concept of operations for 
responding to radiological emergencies. The FRERP 
covers “any peace time radiological emergency that has 
actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences 
within the United States.” The level of response is a 
function of the type and amount of material involved, 
location of the emergency, and impact or potential 
impact on the public and the environment. The plan 
goes on to inform that emergencies at nuclear facilities 
or during the transportation of radioactive materials fall 
within the scope of the plan. Some 16 Federal Agencies 
including the US NRC participate in the FRERP. 
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/national/fre
rp.htm).   
Guidance called out in the FRERP presents 
coordination by Federal Agencies including the role of 
the Agencies with or without State request. The 
authority for response is Executive Order (E.O.) 12241, 
National Contingency Plan, September 29, 1980. “This 
E.O. delegates to the Director of Federal Emergency 
Mangement Administration (FEMA) the responsibility 
for publishing the National Contingency Plan (i.e., the 
FRERP) for accidents at nuclear power facilities and 
requires that it be published from time to time in the 
Federal Register. Executive Order 12241 has been 
amended by Executive Order 12657, FEMA Assistance 
in Emergency Preparedness Planning at Commercial 
NuclearPowerPlants.” – 
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/national/fre
rp.htm
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) January 2007 
states that NRC requirements for nuclear power plants 
call for emergency response plan training: 
“All U.S. nuclear plants must participate in reviewed, 
full-scale emergency exercises every two years. For 
each exercise, the utility creates a confidential 
emergency scenario for use by plant staff and local 
emergency response organizations, including law 
enforcement, local hospitals, radiological monitoring 
teams and others. Post-exercise critiques by the federal 
agencies and exercise participants identify areas for 
correction in future exercises or any improvements 
needed in the plan itself.  
The NRC also requires that plants conduct training 
drills in alternate years to test their emergency response 
capabilities for dealing with a range of events. State and 
local emergency management officials often participate 
in these drills. Since the drills are not graded, the NRC 
permits supervised instruction and resolution of the drill 
scenarios’ problems. NRC inspectors at the plants often 
observe the drills. After the drills, plant officials 
incorporate lessons learned and corrective actions into 
the emergency response plan. 
NRC headquarters and regional staff participate in at 
least one emergency exercise per year in each of the 
four regions. The agency’s emergency response facility 
and teams are critiqued on their responses to the 
simulated emergency.”     
http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=291
The constitution of the response team including 
decisions whether or not to utilize robots to reduce 
exposure, and improve reliability associated with 
mapping is decided on a local level. This decision is 
often made without a great deal of hard data to inform 
the decision makers regarding the benefits and 
limitations of various approaches and technologies. 
Quite simply, this information is not available because 
the studies have not yet been performed. Work is now 
being performed at the INL to develop robotic solutions 
and apply these to specific emergency response 
experiments. The purpose is to better inform decision 
makers of the performance tradeoffs associated with the 
use of various robotic technologies and approaches.  
The behaviors required of personnel (or of personnel 
in conjunction with one or more robots) in response to 
incidents are roughly the same, whether the situation is 
the result of an intentional act or an accident.  These 
behaviors can include stabilizing emergency conditions, 
preparing characterization of radiological conditions 
and immediate consequences, and development of a 
monitoring plan.  “The coordinated response to contain 
or mitigate a threatened or actual release of radioactive 
material would be essentially the same whether it 
resulted from an accidental or deliberate act. Malevolent 
acts involving improvised nuclear or radiation dispersal 
devices, may complicate the magnitude of the threat and 
the need for specialized technical expertise/actions. 
Therefore, sabotage and terrorism are not treated as 
separate types of emergencies.  
Role of Department of Energy (DOE).  
The Department of Energy (DOE) owns and operates 
a variety of radiological activities throughout the United 
States. These activities at fixed nuclear sites include the 
use, storage, and shipment of a variety of radioactive 
materials the shipment of spent reactor fuel the 
production, assembly, and shipment of nuclear weapons 
and special nuclear materials the production and 
shipment of radioactive sources for space ventures and 
the storage and shipment of radioactive and mixed 
waste. DOE is responsible for the safe operation of 
these activities and should an emergency occur at one of 
its sites or an activity under its control, DOE will be the 
lead Federal Agency for the Federal response. 
Due to its technical capabilities and resources, the 
DOE may perform other roles within the Federal 
response to a radiological emergency. With extensive, 
field-based radiological resources throughout the United 
States available for emergency deployment, the DOE 
responds to requests for offsite radiological monitoring 
and assessment assistance and serves as the initial 
coordinator of all such Federal assistance (to include 
initial management of the FRMAC) to State and local 
governments. With other specialized, deployable assets, 
DOE assists other Federal agencies responding to 
malevolent nuclear emergencies, accidents involving 
nuclear weapons not under DOE custody, emergencies 
caused by satellites containing radioactive sources, and 
other radiological incidents as appropriate:  
For these reasons, having the capabilities to simulate 
human behaviors in a wide-array of novel or untested 
environmental context is essential in planning and 
developing human factors design interfaces for next 
generation control room to ensure plant safety.    
DOE has trained personnel, radiological instruments, 
mobile laboratories, and radioanalytical facilities 
located at its national laboratories, production, and other 
facilities throughout the country. Through eight 
Regional Coordinating Offices, these resources form the 
basis for the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), 
which can provide technical assistance in any 
radiological emergency. DOE can provide specialized 
radiation detection instruments and support for both its 
response as lead Federal Agency and as initial 
coordinator of Federal radiological monitoring and 
assessment assistance. Some of the specialized 
resources and capabilities include  
1. “Aerial monitoring capability for tracking 
dispersion of radioactive material and mapping 
ground contamination 
2. A computer-based, emergency preparedness and 
response predictive capability that provides rapid 
predictions of the transport, diffusion, and 
deposition of radionuclides released to the 
atmosphere and dose projections to people and 
the environment 
3. Specialized equipment and instruments and 
response teams for locating radioactive materials 
and handling damaged nuclear weapons 
4. Medical experts on radiation effects and the 
treatment of exposed or contaminated patients 
and 
5. Support facilities for DOE response, including 
command post supplies, communications 
systems, generators, and portable video and 
photographic capabilities.” 
Currently, there is no established performance 
requirement directing the use of robots as part of 
emergency response planning. Extrapolating laboratory 
findings to the field have a number of associated 
challenges.  The INL has used robots to address 
radiological hazards for two decades. Over the last five 
years, particular emphasis has been placed on 
developing intelligent and semi-autonomous robotic 
solutions Also; much has been learned by applying 
robot behaviors to other areas such as countermine 
operations and urban search and rescue (USAR). 
Although, experiments have demonstrated the potential 
value of autonomy for various hazardous environments, 
the mainstream involvement of robots in many civilian 
applications remains a promise unfulfilled.  
Yanco (2004) and Burke (2004) contend that there are 
a number of challenges present in real world operations 
that have slowed the acceptance of robots, particularly 
in the area of search and rescue and remote radiation 
characterization. They both point out that situation 
awareness and poor communication remain problematic.  
We believe that an approach embracing mixed initiative 
control is the logical answer to this dilemma, 
particularly in instances where the operator’s view of 
the robot world is naturally constrained. The INL seeks 
to find an answer in a combination of 3-D visualization, 
improved sensor capability, enhanced robot intelligence 
including spatial reasoning, enhanced robot initiative 
and improved metaphors for control. 
II. STATE OF ART AND HUMAN ROBOTIC 
COLLABORATION 
Robots have a distinct advantage in a variety of 
settings including those where human access is difficult, 
impractical or dangerous. For a review of those 
instances see for example, Murphy (2004). However, 
the ground rules for the nature of the partnership 
between robots and people are still being written. The 
degree to which people are comfortable with levels of 
robot autonomy varies as a function of the application 
and environment.  In extreme emergency situations 
including those we address in this paper and in our 
research, the trust the human has and their knowledge of 
robot activities figures prominently.  This includes 
communication functions and performing tasks to strict 
performance requirements.  In the case of urban search 
and rescue, countermine operations, or emergency 
response to a dirty bomb, the operator needs to be 
confident that performance requirements are being met. 
In order to support research in emergency response, 
the INL has developed a graded approach to 
autonomous behavior and engineered the robot 
intelligence kernel (RIKTM).[ref] In performing this 
work we have taken the approach that the intelligence 
should reside on the robot itself and that, additionally, 
the robot should be capable of protecting itself and 
performing a variety of intrinsic functions without 
human intervention.  We have implemented a number of 
behaviors including guarded motion, obstacle 
avoidance, mapping and localization, path planning and 
waypoint navigation  
To accomplish these behaviors, perceptual algorithms 
running on the robot fuse a variety of range sensor 
information. For instance, on a robot used for USAR 
applications, a laser range finder is mounted on the 
front, and 17 sonar are located around the mid-section 
of the robot. The robot also has highly sensitive bump 
strips in the rear and in the rear and front that register if 
anything has been touched. To protect the top of the 
robot, especially the cameras, we have also added an 
array of infrared proximity sensors that indicate when 
an object is less than nine inches from the robot. 
Additional infrared proximity sensors have been placed 
on the bottom of the robot and point ahead of the robot 
towards the ground in order to prevent the robot from 
traveling into open space (e.g. traveling off of a landing 
down a stairway). Together these sensors provide a field 
of protection around the robot and allow the operator to 
command the robot with full confidence.  
A variety of robotic capabilities may be needed across 
different emergency scenarios. The RIK can be placed 
on many different robots including robots with 
drastically different drive trains, geometries, and sensor 
suites. The portability and re-configurability of the RIK 
insures that the same basic behaviors and interface 
options are available to the user regardless of the robot 
platform. This is also useful for reducing training time 
of personnel since a single operator control unit (OCU) 
can be used to operate many different kinds of robots.   
In recent discussions with explosive ordinance 
disposal (EOD) experts form the 22nd Chemical 
Battalion stationed at Pine Bluff Arsenal, in Arkansas, 
the issue of communications was very high priority. 
Current robotic control schemes involve significant 
communications from and to the robot for directional 
control and visual feedback. To permit deployment 
within shielded structures or caves, we have developed 
a customized communication protocol, which allows 
very low bandwidth communications to pass over a 
serial radio link only when needed. The interface itself 
then unfolds these simple packets into a comprehensive 
interface. Although our visual link and wireless Ethernet 
link were subject to dropouts during a recent 
competition, the 900 Mhz data link that we used to 
transmit this protocol suffered no data loss throughout 
the entire competition and exhibition. 
III. AN INTEGRATED PERFORMANCE 
MODELING APPROACH 
As part of the information gathering process 
supporting our studies, users defined issues experienced 
while addressing radiological emergencies. Their 
experiences were drawn from their time of service in 
Iraq, but those given below can be generalized to other 
radiological emergencies:  
Use of protective equipment.  There is an inherent 
difficulty of operations involving the use of hazardous 
materials (HAZMAT) personnel protective equipment 
(PPE) gear. This is scenario specific, however, in a 
chemical, biological, or radiological scenario it is likely 
that personnel would wear multiple layers of gloves, full 
hooded suits, and respirators or supplied air. The results 
can include severely compromised peripheral vision and 
limited dexterity making task execution “exponentially 
more difficult” in terms of time and effort. Additionally, 
many operators may be needed, depending on the 
difficulty of the task and time required. There may be 
multiple operators, multiple teams (no less than six 
trained personnel at a time) and support personnel for 
decontamination and wash down. This can be greatly 
reduced when a robot is deployed. 
Heat factors.  High temperatures pose a significant 
constraint for personnel wearing HAZMAT suits and 
responding to a dirty bomb. Personnel may have to enter 
the facility wearing full protective gear including a self 
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and a heart rate 
monitor. A typical stay time for SCBA use is 
approximately ½ hour. Tethered air may extend stay 
times. High temperatures may preclude entry without 
cooling vests or other cooling measures. There is no 
stay time requirement for the robot analog. 
Communication Challenges. Challenges associated 
with fiber optic exist because because tethered 
communications cause problems when robots are close 
together. Cables and reels increase system weight and 
the robots can run them over or get them tangled, 
especially when backing up to avoid an obstacle. They 
said that take-up reels are sometimes used. These 
considerations complicate robot operations making 
control of multiple robots difficult and requiring a high 
level of skill.
Information presentation. Regarding information 
presentation, experts replied that “Colors don’t matter, 
but a key to aid deciphering must be provided. Further, 
you want a 2 milli-radiation exposure man (mrem) line 
(press) and a 10 mrem line (personnel safety boundary) 
should be indicated.  This could be present in the form 
of a contours line notifying the operator that personnel 
time in that zone must be limited. These factors and 
findings from previous studies went into the design of 
the study described below. Findings from this study are 
the subject of a separate report to be published at a later 
date. 
Evaluating Collaborative Behavior  
Purpose:  The study plan aims to rigorously evaluate 
the effectiveness and suitability of control capabilities 
and interfaces with three degrees of robotic autonomy 
for unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) ranging from 
teleoperated with no autonomy, similar to current 
activities, to mostly autonomous with an advanced 
operator control unit. The experiment is designed to 
assess human/robot collaboration and effectiveness in 
mapping, detecting, communicating, determining, and 
marking the location of a simulated dirty bomb.   
Robot control will be conducted from a mobile trailer 
set up outside of a building that is part of the critical 
infrastructure test range (CITRC) (Figure 1). Two 
radiation sources will be placed inside the building, one 
in a relatively open (easy) area and the other in a 
cluttered office (difficult). Subjects will not enter the 
building with the radiological sources exposed or be 
exposed to radiation above background levels. A 
radiation control technician (RCT) will provide 
continuous monitoring when radiological sources are 
exposed. An experiment controller will be stationed in 
the trailer to begin the experiment, answer questions, 
simulate military-type controls (hold points), and 
protect equipment.  
For each of three modes, sources will be placed and 
exposed and the robot will enter the facility through one 
of the entry doors. The subject will be directed to search 
the building using the specified equipment and 
capabilities to find and mark the location of the sources 
on the floor plan. Subjects will be advised that there is 
to be equal importance associated with logging the 
radiation levels and with pinpointing the source 
locations and communicating. They will also be 
instructed to record radiation levels on the floor plan. 
Procedures will require that the robot maintain a 
distance of 2 feet from the source. Once both sources 
are identified and the area searched, the robot will be 
driven to a marked position and directed to exit the 
building quickly. Once the robot has exited the building, 
the experimental session is concluded. The duration of 
each session is expected to be one hour or less and the 
building may be subdivided to reduce the area subject to 
search. 
The CITRC includes an airfield and 5 facilities 
covering several miles with roads, buildings, water, 
sewer, communications and electrical distribution 
systems. 
All subjects will be trained and allowed to operate 
robots in all three modes prior to the experiment. Each 
subject will be assessed in each mode, with presentation 
order being randomized.. The equipment for each of the 
3 modes is as follows. 
Mode 1 - Basic Tele-operation  - The equipment for 
Mode 1 includes: 
iRobotTM Packbot 
Floor plan 
Log paper/notepad 
MGP Instruments AMP-50 Gamma detector 
(dual) 
Detector output will include level in counts and 
audible clicks 
900 MHZ Freewave transceiver for control 
communications 
802.11b wireless transmitter for video output 
Screen for display of video images 
A joystick or gamepad-type controller as for 
Sony Playstation 
Mode 2 - Tele-operation with mapping and guarded 
motion - The equipment for Mode 2 includes: 
iRobotTM Packbot 
Floor plan 
Log paper/notepad 
MGP Instruments AMP-50 Gamma detector 
(dual) 
Detector output will include level in counts and 
audible clicks 
900 MHZ Freewave transceiver for control 
communications 
802.11b wireless transmitter for video output 
Robot intelligence kernel (RIK) 
Laser range finder 
On-The-Fly mapping and localization for 
building interior features 
Radiation sensor reading abstraction (plume 
data represented on map 
Robot will employ obstacle avoidance 
behaviors 
Screen for display of video and abstracted map 
and sensor images  
A joystick or gamepad-type controller as for 
Sony Playstation 
Mode 3 - Collaborative tasking - The equipment for 
Mode 3 includes: 
iRobotTM Packbot 
Floor plan 
Log paper/notepad 
MGP Instruments AMP-50 Gamma detector 
(dual) 
Detector output will include level in counts and 
audible clicks 
900 MHZ Freewave transceiver for control 
communications 
802.11b wireless transmitter for video output 
Robot intelligence kernel (RIK) 
Laser range finder 
On-The-Fly mapping and localization for 
building interior features 
Radiation sensor reading abstraction (plume 
data represented on map) 
Robot will include all robotic autonomy 
behaviors 
Screen for display of video and abstracted map 
and sensor images  
Advanced operator control unit (OCU) with 
simplified controls including target mode 
A joystick or gamepad-type controller as for 
Sony Playstation 
.
Range of behavior and relationship to presentation 
mode In the collaborative tasking condition the robot is 
capable of path planning, obstacle avoidance, Go To, 
target, and radiation painting..  The human behaviors 
are to observe and to take action by dropping and 
clicking on a target.  The robot finds its own path to the 
target while gathering information. In the guarded 
motion condition the robot capability includes guarded 
motion, mapping and radiation painting.  In the basic 
teleoperation, video, guarded motion is used to stop the 
robot from running into obstacles and a time penalty is 
invoked.  In both the guarded motion and basic tele 
operation conditions, the human takes action by driving 
a joystick.  
From this study we hope to attain some basic 
information on the value of a robot, value of mapping 
and the value of increased levels of autonomy.  
Dependent measures include localization accuracy, 
logging accuracy, trespass on exclusion zones, and time 
to negotiate obstacles.  
B. Designing the interface 
Obviously, one of the keys to superior collaborative 
performance lies in the design of the control interface. 
Moving from using a joystick to drive the robot to  
moving a target and allowing the robot to find its way 
requires both a different perspective on collaboration as 
well as a difference in the interface. Many other 
improvements have gone into the design of the 
interface. This work includes review of data fusion 
methods, improvements to controllers i.e., smaller and 
lighter, modification of interface software and design of 
data representation schemes. Also, new to this study is 
the onboard incorporation of additional advanced 
HAZMAT sensors such as radiation sensors.  
As part of our design approach, we try to reduce 
complexity for the operator while increasing their 
understanding of the environment.  We do this by 
imparting intelligence to the robot and simplifying the 
interface as much as possible. The underlying 
algorithms may be complex but the operator’s view of 
the robots world need not be complex.  Arguments for 
the benefits of employing simplicity in design abound. 
For recent thoughts on the topic see Maeda (2006). One 
of our principle design guidelines is to review, review 
and review. The final design is as much as result of the 
failures as it is successes. Previous studies at the INL 
have indicated without the right interaction metaphor, 
users do not know what to expect from their mysterious 
and complex robot “peers.” Increased autonomy and 
initiative is open to review in the sense that autonomy 
may actually complicate the task and frustrate the 
operator if the interface and underlying interaction 
metaphor are not designed appropriately. The robot 
must demonstrate reliable predictable behavior if it is to 
be trusted by the operator.  
IV. SUMMARY / CONCLUSION 
In emergency response, personnel are often placed at 
risk from environmental conditions. Heat, radiation, and 
chemical spills can reduce the stay time from personnel 
thus requiring redundancy in terms of personnel. Some 
of the tasking can be shifted to the robot, reducing the 
required number of personnel and personnel exposure.  
We believe that the use of robots can result in reduced 
exposure, fewer personnel, and less operator fatigue. An 
experiment is proposed and discussed that will also 
empirically assess the benefits in terms of quality of 
data, task time till completion, and subjective measures 
such as operator confidence. 
The goal of our research is to have the operator view 
the robot as a team mate as opposed to a taxi with a 
sensor suite on board. We recognize that the robot is a 
tool, but we believe that this tool can be trusted to 
perform a variety of task sub-components with a high 
degree of proficiency – which may exceed a human 
performing the same task. These subtasks include 
mapping and localization, obstacle avoidance, path 
planning and creating a dynamic representation of the 
radiation plume. The use of 3-D imaging based on our 
collaborations with SRI Company and Brigham Young 
University (BYU) add a great improvement to the 
interface.  Replacing the “joystick” metaphor with 
alternate control designs and improved operator 
representations of the world offers opportunity to 
expand the ways in which robots are tasked.  We 
recognize that different robots have different uses and 
advantages and have designed the intelligence kernel so 
that it can be implemented on various robot platforms. 
To this end, a number of near term exploratory studies 
are planned. This paper has provided a synopsis of the 
experiment plan for the first in a series of studies 
focused on emergency response to radiological hazards. 
We hope that this new robotic capability as well as the 
increased understanding achieved by these studies will 
benefit the nuclear power plant industry as well as DOE. 
Because the application of collaborative behavior in 
high risk emergency response situations can serve to 
reduce exposure and potential loss of life, progress in 
this area can not come fast enough.   
V. DISCLAIMER 
This paper was prepared as an account of work 
sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor 
any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes 
any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any 
legal liability or responsibility for any third party’s use, 
or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, 
product, or process disclosed in this paper, or represents 
that its use by such third party would not infringe 
privately owned rights. 
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